Anthropologists have long argued that fear of victimization through witchcraft accusations promotes cooperation in small-scale societies 1 . Others have argued that witchcraft beliefs undermine trust and therefore reduce social cohesion 2 . However, there are very few, if any, quantified empirical examples demonstrating how witchcraft labels can structure cooperation in real human communities. Here we show a case from a farming community in China where people labelled zhu were thought capable of supernatural activity, particularly poisoning food. The label was usually applied to adult women heads of household and often inherited down the female line. We found that those in zhu households were less likely to give or receive gifts or farm help to or from non-zhu households; nor did they have sexual partnerships or children with those in non-zhu households. However, those in zhu households did preferentially help and reproduce with each other. Although the tag is common knowledge to other villagers and used in cooperative and reproductive partner choice, we found no evidence that this assortment was based on cooperativeness or quality. We favour the explanation that stigmatization originally arose as a mechanism to harm female competitors. Once established, fear that the trait is transmissible may help explain the persistence of this deep-rooted cultural belief.
Accounts of witchcraft beliefs have been documented from all world regions, often in those communities where formal legal systems are weak or absent 3 . Conceptions of witchcraft around the world are heterogeneous, but share some similarities: notions of poisoning are common 4, 5 ; supposed witches were often conceived of as greedy 6 or beautiful 7 or those that stand out in any way; accusations arise in the context of attribution of blame for illness, death or other misfortunes 1, 8 and could arise within families 9 , such as between cowives 10 , or from the wider community 8, 9 ; harm could often be cured through payments or medicines 1 ; and in some societies the label could lead to violent punishment 9 . It was common for women or children to be accused, especially older women 2 . In some cases the risk of being labelled as a witch appears heritable 1, 11 . Spiteful witchcraft accusations could arise for revenge, or due to reproductive competition or indeed any form of competition for resources.
During the course of fieldwork on cooperative networks in a rural population in southwestern China, we became aware that some individuals were stigmatized with the cultural label zhu, or zhubo. The label is related to a type of taboo associated with fear of food poisoning. Accounts of zhu mentioned a notion of infection that has some parallels with biological parasitism. Which households were stigmatized in this way was common knowledge and people sometimes advised us against eating in zhu households. Women were the most likely to be considered capable of poisoning, with men most likely to be cited as victims 12 . Accounts suggested accusations could spread quickly through villages 13 . Zhu, zhubo or du is sometimes translated as 'poison giving' or witchcraft 12 . Here, the label put stigma onto the whole household and was likely to have been inherited 7, 12 . There are also accounts of households becoming contaminated with zhu through bringing valuable metal objects into the house 13 . However, the origin of particular accusations, whether historical or more recent, was unclear, even to those who were the subject of such rumours 11 . This status was sometimes reported to be something that was not the fault of the stigmatized individuals. During communal labouring on farms, the farm owner usually provides meals for those who work on their farm all day. Thus, communication about a reputation for food poisoning relating to a particular household would be detrimental to recruiting help on that farm, or indeed to those from that household being considered suitable partners of any kind.
In accounts of this phenomenon in the ethnographic literature of the region, the label zhu in this group, the Mosuo, appears similar to something referred to as du or gu 12 and to the label chao pu xi in the neighbouring Naxi 7 . A similar phenomenon has also been described in the Qiang, also in southwest China. There, accused women, said to be outsiders and/or those considered beautiful, are described as 'poison cats' and shunned 5 . There are also strong similarities with the 'poison givers' in Bhutan 11 and with some concepts of witchcraft in Tibetan Nyimba 4 . Such tags could be attached to significant sections of the population, contradicting some accounts suggesting the phenomenon is marginal. There are historical accounts of the denouncing of some women as dangerous in several Indian, Thai and Chinese societies occurring on a very large scale. Whole villages of those labelled pippa were described in the Yuan in northern Thailand and in the Dai in Yunnan, China 7 . This is thought to have arisen in the context of patriarchal powers attempting to realign gender relations away from more female-centred or matrilineal cultures 7 . In Sichuan, China, the Naxi are thought to have switched from a matrilineal to a patrilineal social structure after coming under the control of patrilineal Han in the eighteenth century. There were accounts of large numbers of women being denounced as chao pu xi or 'keepers of evil spirits' at that time. The introduction of the Confucian ideals of female obedience to men was said to be associated with large numbers of female suicides in the region, some accounts suggesting many suicides were daughters of the denounced women 7 . One account suggests Mosuo households can rid themselves of the label by changing their family name from the matrilineal name to their patrilineal one 14 . Accounts of the Mosuo acquiring the label zhu or du by bringing valuable metals into the household, possibly from other ethnic groups 7, 13 , has parallels with the process of acquiring the label pippa in the Dai of Yunnan 7 . Such tags appear to have been used as mechanisms for levelling or appropriating wealth from women 7, [12] [13] [14] [15] .
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In 2012 we collected data on cooperation between households by collecting social networks from five villages in rural southwestern China, comprising about 800 households (see Supplementary Methods). Social networks were measured in three ways. Demographic data enabled us to identify kinship networks between all households, including where children were living (in the case of this population fathers often do not live with their children due to the prevalence of duolocal residence 16 ; see Supplementary Information). We also played some simple economic gift games with a subsample of households, in which individuals were allowed to give gifts of money (provided by us) to up to three adult individuals resident in any other household in the study site (see Supplementary  Information) . Finally, we collected data from working groups on a subsample of farms, during planting and harvest time, to identify who was helping whom in their fields. This resulted in four measures of the relationships between households: biological relatedness between households; whether anyone in one household had a sexual partner in another household; whether anyone gave a gift in a gift game to another household; and whether they helped on another household's farm. We also played a simple donation game, where we gave each person 10 yuan that they could divide between themselves and an anonymous person in the same village. This we used as a general measure of within-village cooperativeness.
After we had collected all the social network data and economic game data, we asked a few informants from the villages to identify any household that people considered zhu in their locality. Those labelled as such comprised 13.7% of all households. Data on all the four measures of social connection (sexual partnerships including marriage, children, farm help and gifts) indicated that having the label zhu predicted that a household would be somewhat excluded from mainstream social networks. The clustering shown in Fig. 1 shows that zhu households often clustered together in small networks (up to about 10 households at most) or dyads with each other. This was especially true with respect to reproductive partnerships and children (Fig. 1d) . Figure 2 shows the results of a permutation test run on each of these networks, which shows that the probability of this level of assortment occurring by chance is overwhelmingly unlikely in all four networks. Although zhu-labelled households received no less help on their farm and only slightly fewer gifts in the gift game overall (Supplementary Table 1) , it is very clear that the gifts and help they did receive were more likely to be from other zhu households (Figs. 1 and 2 and Supplementary Table 2 ). There is even stronger assortment with respect to reproductive behaviour, with very few zhu having any sexual partners or children in non-zhu households (Figs. 1 and 2 and Supplementary Table 2) .
Thus the information we had received from some villagers clearly had salience across the population. Those in households stigmatized by this reputation for poisoning were surviving in the community by assorting preferentially with each other, both in terms of whom they decided to help and to give gifts, and whom they chose as partners and spouses ( Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 2 ). Biological relatedness was the main factor that mediated social networks extending between households tagged as zhu and those that were not (Supplementary Table 2c ).
This self-assortment may counter some of the costs that might otherwise be caused by exclusion from mainstream social networks. Those households with the tag zhu were not necessarily poor; in fact, they were ranked as slightly wealthier than average (Supplementary Fig. 1 and Supplementary Table 4 ). (It should be noted that land was redistributed according to household size soon after the formation of the People's Republic of China, so historical differences in land-holdings did not persist into current generations.) There is very limited dispersal from their natal village for zhu and non-zhu: 82.6% of non-zhu and 82.3% of zhu had either never left their natal household or had dispersed to another household within their birth village (Supplementary Table 5 ). In most respects, the household characteristics of those labelled zhu are not atypical of other households in the population. The households reported to contain zhu were not necessarily clustered geographically (Supplementary Text). Nor was there any evidence from the donation game that they were any less cooperative towards the village than any other villagers; the distribution of donation sizes were almost identical between those with and without the tag (Table 1) .
Almost all women heads of household in the population had children ( Supplementary Fig. 3 ), although government legislation in the 1980s restricted fertility to three births per women, which is reducing the variance in reproductive success. However, Fig. 3 shows that female heads of zhu households have lower than average reproductive success (Supplementary Table 6 ), although the effect is small. Males in zhu households did not appear to suffer significant fitness costs from being in households tagged with this label (Supplementary Table 7 ). Age at first birth was not associated with the label zhu (Supplementary Table 8 ). It is a possibility that in many cases the accusation against women occurred when already adult (a woman in Bhutan reports how she was ostracized for being a 'poison giver' in middle age and she notes that her mother had suffered the same fate). More harmful effects of exclusion may take effect later in life (as zhu were considered to be more dangerous when older). It appears that assortment with other tagged individuals clearly mitigated any potential costs of ostracism by those who were not tagged.
As our data on this cultural tag are not longitudinal, we are unable to verify the claim that this form of stigmatization was inherited over generations (in the sense of some mother/daughter correlation in the risk of acquiring the label), but the strong reproductive assortment suggests this is likely. Zhu were in fact more closely related to each other than they were to non-zhu. Within villages, mean (s.d.) genealogical relatedness between zhu was r = 0.152 (0.163) and genealogical relatedness between non-zhu was r = 0.125 (0.144), whereas average genealogical relatedness between zhu and non-zhu is r = 0.083 (0.096). Although they might be considered as an outgroup, there is no evidence that zhu migrated in from elsewhere, at least in recent times, nor that they are more likely to have moved villages (Supplementary Table 5 ).
Thus, we illustrate here how mutually cooperative groups or subpopulations can arise on the basis of assortment on an arbitrary cultural tag. Many of the characteristics of being labelled as scapegoats for harmful events, as described in the abundant ethnographic literature on witchcraft accusations, find parallels with social evolutionary theories for maintaining cooperation through the strategic use of cooperation and punishment. Some theories and laboratory experiments suggest cooperation between unrelated individuals might emerge due to assortment on cooperativeness [17] [18] [19] [20] . One study claims that cooperators assort in a mobile forager population 21 , but spatial assortment might be easier in nomadic groups than in settled farmers. Third-party punishment involving reputational damage to Each player was given 10 yuan. They decided how much they would like to keep and how much to give to an anonymous, randomly selected villager. Using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test to compare a player's offer to an anonymous partner between individuals from zhu and non-zhu households, we found that there is no difference between them (number of players, N = 564, Wilcoxon's rank statistic, W = 18,903, P = 0.7282).
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Nature HumaN BeHaviour defectors might be more prevalent in sedentary populations, where the option of walking away 22, 23 from uncooperative neighbours is not a readily available strategy. There is some evidence that participation in collective tasks for the public good can enhance the social networks of more cooperative farmers 24 . However, we find no evidence in this study, either from real-world behaviour or economic games, that those labelled zhu are uncooperative. Hence, our study, although showing strong evidence for assortment on the basis of a tag, finds no support for the hypothesis that assortment is based on cooperativeness, so we cannot claim that this harmful tag is punishment for selfishness.
We favour competition as a more plausible explanation for the origin of cultural tags that stigmatize certain individuals or households. A comparative study in Africa based on a questionnaire suggests that societies where there are strong witchcraft beliefs report low levels of trust; witchcraft beliefs undermine interhousehold cooperation rather than promote it 2 . This view fits with anecdotal accounts of fear of witchcraft accusations disrupting cooperation, which can undermine participatory approaches to poverty alleviation 25 . We have shown previously, in this region, that there are lower levels of cooperation with other villagers in those societies with low rates of female dispersal, such as this one, when compared with those societies in the region where female dispersal rates are higher 26 . Societies with low dispersal also have higher relatedness between households. Qiang villages where witchcraft beliefs have been described as prevalent are also characterized by low dispersal 5 . Thus, in sedentary groups, where dispersal is low and relatedness high, competition between households may be more intense and more likely to generate attempts at reputational damage through the use of harmful cultural tags. Our finding that this label is more likely to fall on slightly wealthier and female-headed households fits with anecdotal accounts from other populations of accusations arising out of jealousy or spite, directed particularly at women 7, 25 . The difficulty in establishing the precise origin of rumours may make the process of stigmatizing others relatively low cost to accusers. The ecological conditions in which this cultural tag has persisted has some features predicted to enhance the possibility that spiteful behaviour can evolve 27 . It is also possible that villages with some residents that were feared for having dangerous powers may have gained some protective advantage against outsiders 5 ; that could be one reason why ostracized subgroups, while shunned by the majority, were nonetheless tolerated within the community. Instances of farm help depend on the amount of fieldwork conducted per village, and gift giving depends on whether households chose to participate in the games, so the absence of either should not be taken as absence of cooperation. Networks were produced using the igraph package in R 3.3, with a Fruchterman-Reingold layout. Spatial location in the figures is arbitrary and does not represent spatial location in the village. Individual households not put in clusters are omitted from these figures.
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One origin myth describes some Mosuo travelling to the Naxi to gain this dangerous power as they thought it might be useful in conflict with enemies 7 . Although one would expect cultural beliefs relating to supernatural powers to decline with education, witchcraft beliefs in Africa have been shown to be surprisingly resistant to modernization 2 . It was clear from our observations that many villagers did fear tagged individuals as a risk of contamination and avoided visiting their houses, while other villagers said they did not believe this. However, in any cultural system where a harmful tag is considered able to contaminate others, even those who do not believe tagged individuals to be dangerous might nonetheless incur costs were they to assort with tagged individuals, as they would themselves then run the risk of ostracism. In other words, non-punishers may be punished, as long as at least some of the population hold these beliefs. Third-party punishment could itself act as a signal 28 , in this case of not being part of the stigmatized group. This may explain why such deep-rooted cultural beliefs persist and can continue to structure populations, even in the face of modernization (Supplementary Video 1) . Demographic and socioeconomic surveys were conducted in five villages in Sichuan Province during 2012. One adult was interviewed on behalf of all household members about details including name, age, sex, ethnic group, and names of spouses and parents. Pedigrees were created by linking each person in the census to their mother and father. Relatedness between each pair of individuals was calculated from the pedigree data using a modified version of PyPedal 29 .
Methods
Relatedness between households was calculated as the mean relatedness between each pair of individuals in the ego and alter households.
In 2013, participants played gift games in which they gave gifts to other individuals. Participants were endowed with 15 yuan (equivalent to pay for a few hours work locally), which they could give-in 5 yuan denominations-to between one and three recipients of their choice who were resident in any of the study villages. The participants then played the within-village donation game in which they were given 10 yuan to split between themselves and another anonymous, randomly allocated player from their village.
Spot observations of people working on farms were conducted during the planting seasons of 2011 and 2012 and the harvest season of 2012. Locations were randomly sampled within the study villages, giving unbiased, although incomplete, coverage.
Wealth ranking of households was conducted by one to three key informants in each village. We presented them with cards representing the heads of each household. They then divided the cards into three piles: rich, medium and poor. The villagers further divided 'medium' into another four piles, giving a total of six piles of households: very rich (1) to very poor (6) . The people who did the wealth ranking were usually current or former heads of that village who were familiar with every household (note that wealth ranks can only be interpreted within the context of each village).
Whether a household was considered zhu by the community was common knowledge in every village, and those considered zhu in each local area were identified by someone resident in that area. Table 3 for sample sizes. Red diamonds show observed assortativity coefficients. Boxplots represent null distributions generated from a permutation test of 1,000 random networks with the same numbers of nodes, edges and zhu labels as in the observed networks. Thus the probability of the observed levels of assortment being random is clearly P ≪ 0.001 for all four measures. The box represents the interquartile range (IQR); the line through the middle is the median. Whiskers extend to 1.5 × IQR; outliers are plotted as dots. 
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We used zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regressions to model the effect of being labelled a zhu house on the amount of help observed on its farm and the number of gifts received from other households (both measures of in-degree). ZIP models account for overdispersion-in this case, an 'excessive' number of households with in-degree of zero-by assuming there are two types of household: households whose in-degree is generated by a Poisson process, and households with a zero probability of having in-degree > 0 (that is, households for which no farm work was observed due to the random sampling of households). ZIP models thus estimate a Poisson model for the count data alongside a logistic regression predicting the log odds that a household had in-degree = 0; both are interpreted in the standard manner. The ZIP models controlled for household size, wealth rank and sex of the household head and included village as a categorical variable. This analysis did not include village A, because only a few observations were made there and none included helping on zhu farms. This left n = 660 households.
We used multilevel Poisson regressions to analyse the relationship between presence or absence of the zhu label and reproductive success (RS), measured as the number of living children, with varying intercepts for villages (Fig. 3 and Supplementary Tables 6-8 ). These models were fitted separately on female and male household heads (n = 352 and 379, respectively). We fitted Cox regressions to determine the effect of being known as zhu upon age at first birth (AFB). Models were fitted separately on adult (aged 15 years or older) females and males (n = 1,625 and 1,641, respectively). We used logistic regression to examine what factors predicted if a household was labelled zhu or not (n = 514). Note that this is a model of households, unlike the RS and AFB models, which are models of individuals.
For the RS, AFB and ZIP analyses we used a model selection approach on sets of a priori candidate models, using model averaging as appropriate 30 . See Supplementary Tables for further information. To measure assortment based on the zhu label, we calculated assortativity coefficients 31 on the farm labour, gifts, partners and children networks. We ran permutation tests to generate a null distribution of assortativity coefficients by simulating 1,000 random networks with the same properties as the real networks: that is, the same numbers of gift givers or farm helpers, the same number of connections to recipient households, and the same proportion of people labelled zhu in the networks.
We used 'join count' statistics to examine whether zhu houses were physically clustered in the study villages. Join counts test the extent to which the occurrence of zhu households at spatially adjacent locations is due to chance 32 . Analyses were conducted in R 3.3 33 
Data exclusions
Describe any data exclusions. Only households headed by Mosuo were included. One village was excluded from the network anlayses as we had very little data on working in the fields, and poor coverage on gift games, so only the four villages with good data coverage on all measures are used in this paper.
Replication
Describe whether the experimental findings were reliably reproduced.
Only the economic 'games' were experimental and we used the same protocol at each game location.
Randomization
Describe how samples/organisms/participants were allocated into experimental groups.
We took the first 20 people who volunteered at the experimental location for each set of economic games.
Blinding
Describe whether the investigators were blinded to group allocation during data collection and/or analysis.
All data on kinship, gift games and other social network data were collected without any knowledge of the 'zhubu' tag by the research team. During data analysis the researchers were not blinded, but the clustering patterns were determined by R algorithms.
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Statistical parameters
For all figures and tables that use statistical methods, confirm that the following items are present in relevant figure legends (or in the Methods section if additional space is needed).
n/a Confirmed
The exact sample size (n) for each experimental group/condition, given as a discrete number and unit of measurement (animals, litters, cultures, etc.)
A description of how samples were collected, noting whether measurements were taken from distinct samples or whether the same sample was measured repeatedly A statement indicating how many times each experiment was replicated
The statistical test(s) used and whether they are one-or two-sided (note: only common tests should be described solely by name; more complex techniques should be described in the Methods section)
A description of any assumptions or corrections, such as an adjustment for multiple comparisons
The test results (e.g. P values) given as exact values whenever possible and with confidence intervals noted A clear description of statistics including central tendency (e.g. median, mean) and variation (e.g. standard deviation, interquartile range)
Clearly defined error bars
See the web collection on statistics for biologists for further resources and guidance.
Software
Policy information about availability of computer code
Describe the software used to analyze the data in this study.
R (precise packages all listed in methods section of the paper)
For manuscripts utilizing custom algorithms or software that are central to the paper but not yet described in the published literature, software must be made available to editors and reviewers upon request. We strongly encourage code deposition in a community repository (e.g. GitHub). Nature Methods guidance for providing algorithms and software for publication provides further information on this topic.
Materials and reagents
Policy information about availability of materials
Materials availability
Indicate whether there are restrictions on availability of unique materials or if these materials are only available for distribution by a for-profit company.
no unique materials were used
Antibodies
Describe the antibodies used and how they were validated for use in the system under study (i.e. assay and species). No animals were used
